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Some Conclusions

"The Palestine problem is still in its infancy. The preface ended with the [end of the] Mandate and Chapter One began [in November 1947]. . . . Do not miss [the 'next installment']!" recommended the British consul general in Jerusalem midway through the 1948 War.[1]

"Chapter One," the first war between Israel and the Arabs, was the culmination of developments and a conflict that had begun in the 1880s, when the first Zionist settlers landed on the shores of the Holy Land, their arrival and burgeoning presence increasingly resented by the local Arab population. Over the following decades, the Arabs continuously inveighed, first with the Ottoman rulers, and then with their British successors, against the Zionist influx and ambitions, and they repeatedly attacked the new settlers, initially in individual acts of banditry and terrorism and then in growingly massive outbreaks, which at first resembled nothing more than European pogroms.

The Zionists saw their enterprise and aspirations as legitimate, indeed, as supremely moral: the Jewish people, oppressed and murdered in Christendom and in the Islamic lands, was bent on saving itself by returning to its ancient land and there reestablishing its self-determination and sovereignty. But the Arab inhabitants, supported by the surrounding, awakening Arab world, decried the influx as an aggressive invasion by colonialist, infidel aliens; it had to be resisted. The culminating assault on the Yishuv in 1947–1949 was a natural result of this posture of antagonism and resistance.

David Ben-Gurion well understood these contradictory perspectives. As he told his colleagues, against the backdrop of the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939: "We must see the situation for what it is. On the security front, we are those attacked and who are on the defensive. But in the political field we are the attackers and the Arabs are those defending themselves. They are living in the country and own the land, the village. We live in the Diaspora and want only to immigrate [to Palestine] and gain possession of [lirkosh] the land from them."[2] Years later, after the establishment of Israel, he expatiated on the Arab perspective in a conversation with the Zionist leader Nahum Goldmann: "I don't understand your optimism. . . . Why should the Arabs make peace? If I was an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: We have taken their country. Sure, God promised it to us, but what does that matter to them? Our God is not theirs. We come from Israel, it's true, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: We have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?"[3]

To be sure, while mentioning "God," Ben-Gurion—a child of Eastern European social democracy and nationalism who knew no Arabic (though, as prime minister, he found time to study ancient Greek, to read Plato in the original, and Spanish, to read *Don Quixote*)—had failed fully to appreciate the depth of the Arabs' abhorrence of the Zionist-Jewish presence in Palestine, an abhorrence anchored in centuries of Islamic Judeophobia with deep religious and historical roots. The Jewish rejection of the Prophet Muhammad is embedded in the Qur'an and is etched in the psyche of those brought up on its suras.[4] As the Muslim Brotherhood put it in 1948: "Jews are the historic enemies of Muslims and carry the greatest hatred for the nation of Muhammad."[5]

Such thinking characterized the Arab world, where the overwhelming majority of the population were, and remain, believers. In 1943, when President Franklin Roosevelt sent out feelers about a negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem, King Ibn Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia responded that he was "prepared to receive anyone of any religion except (repeat except) a Jew."[6] A few weeks earlier, Ibn Sa'ud had explained, in a letter to Roosevelt: "Palestine . . . has been an Arab country since the dawn of history and . . . was never inhabited by the Jews for more than a period of time, during which their history in the land was full of murder and cruelty. . . . [There is] religious hostility . . . between the Moslems and the Jews from the beginning of Islam . . . which arose from the treacherous conduct of the Jews towards Islam and the Moslems and their prophet."[7] Jews were seen as unclean; in-

deed, even those who had contact with them were seen as beyond the pale. In late 1947 the Al-Azhar University ʿulema, major authorities in the Islamic world, issued a fatwa that anyone dealing with "the Jews," commercially or economically (such as by "buying their produce"), "is a sinner and criminal . . . who will be regarded as an apostate to Islam, he will be separated from his spouse. It is prohibited to be in contact with him."[8]

This anti-Semitic mindset was not restricted to Wahhabi chieftains or fundamentalist imams. Samir Rifaʾi, Jordan's prime minister, in 1947 told visiting newsmen, "The Jews are a people to be feared. . . . Give them another 25 years and they will be all over the Middle East, in our country and Syria and Lebanon, in Iraq and Egypt. . . . They were responsible for starting the two world wars. . . . Yes, I have read and studied, and I know they were behind Hitler at the beginning of his movement."[9]

The 1948 War, to be sure, was a milestone in a contest between two national movements over a piece of territory. But it was also—if only because that is how many if not most Arabs saw it (and see it today)—part of a more general, global struggle between the Islamic East and the West, in which the Land of Israel/Palestine figured, and still figures, as a major battlefront. The Yishuv saw itself, and was universally seen by the Muslim Arab world, as an embodiment and outpost of the European "West." The assault of 1947–1948 was an expression of the Islamic Arabs' rejection of the West and its values as well as a reaction to what it saw as a European colonialist encroachment against sacred Islamic soil. There was no understanding (or tolerance) of Zionism as a national liberation movement of another people. And, aptly, the course of the war reflected the civilizational disparity, in which a Western society, deploying superior organizational and technological skills, overcame a coalition of infinitely larger Islamic Arab societies.

Historians have tended to ignore or dismiss, as so much hot air, the jihadi rhetoric and flourishes that accompanied the two-stage assault on the Yishuv and the constant references in the prevailing Arab discourse to that earlier bout of Islamic battle for the Holy Land, against the Crusaders. This is a mistake. The 1948 War, from the Arabs' perspective, was a war of religion as much as, if not more than, a nationalist war over territory. Put another way, the territory was sacred: its violation by infidels was sufficient grounds for launching a holy war and its conquest or reconquest, a divinely ordained necessity. In the months before the invasion of 15 May 1948, King ʿAbdullah, the most moderate of the coalition leaders, repeatedly spoke of "saving" the holy places.[10] As the day of invasion approached, his focus on Jerusalem, according to Alec Kirkbride, grew increasingly obsessive. "In our souls," wrote the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, "Palestine occupies a spiritual holy place which is above abstract nationalist feelings. In it we

have the blessed breeze of Jerusalem and the blessings of the Prophets and their disciples."[11]

The evidence is abundant and clear that many, if not most, in the Arab world viewed the war essentially as a holy war. To fight for Palestine was the "inescapable obligation on every Muslim," declared the Muslim Brotherhood in 1938. Indeed, the battle was of such an order of holiness that in 1948 one Islamic jurist ruled that believers should forego the hajj and spend the money thus saved on the jihad in Palestine.[12] In April 1948, the mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Muhammad Mahawif, issued a fatwa positing jihad in Palestine as the duty of all Muslims. The Jews, he said, intended "to take over . . . all the lands of Islam."[13] Martyrdom for Palestine conjured up, for Muslim Brothers, "the memories of the Battle of Badr . . . as well as the early Islamic jihad for spreading Islam and Salah al-Din's [Saladin's] liberation of Palestine" from the Crusaders.[14] Jihad for Palestine was seen in prophetic-apocalyptic terms, as embodied in the following hadith periodically quoted at the time: "The day of resurrection does not come until Muslims fight against Jews, until the Jews hide behind trees and stones and until the trees and stones shout out: 'O Muslim, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.'"[15]

The jihadi impulse underscored both popular and governmental responses in the Arab world to the UN partition resolution and was central to the mobilization of the "street" and the governments for the successive onslaughts of November–December 1947 and May–June 1948. The mosques, mullahs, and ʿulema all played a pivotal role in the process. Even Christian Arabs appear to have adopted the jihadi discourse. Matiel Mughannam, the Lebanese-born Christian who headed the AHC-affiliated Arab Women's Organization in Palestine, told an interviewer early in the civil war: "The UN decision has united all Arabs, as they have never been united before, not even against the Crusaders. . . . [A Jewish state] has no chance to survive now that the 'holy war' has been declared. All the Jews will eventually be massacred."[16] The Islamic fervor stoked by the hostilities seems to have encompassed all or almost all Arabs: "No Moslem can contemplate the holy places falling into Jewish hands," reported Kirkbride from Amman. "Even the Prime Minister [Tawfiq Abul Huda] . . . who is by far the steadiest and most sensible Arab here, gets excited on the subject."[17]

Nor did this impulse evaporate with the Arab defeat. On the contrary. On 12 December 1948 the ʿulema of Al-Azhar reissued their call for jihad, specifically addressing "the Arab Kings, Presidents of Arab Republics, . . . and leaders of public opinion." It was, ruled the council, "necessary to liberate Palestine from the Zionist bands . . . and to return the inhabitants driven from their homes." The Arab armies had "fought victoriously" (sic) "in the

conviction that they were fulfilling a sacred religious duty." The ʿulema condemned King ʿAbdullah for sowing discord in Arab ranks: "Damnation would be the lot of those who, after warning, did not follow the way of the believers," concluded the ʿulema.[18]

The immediate trigger of the 1948 War was the November 1947 UN partition resolution. The Zionist movement, except for its fringes, accepted the proposal. Most lamented the imperative of giving up the historic heartland of Judaism, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), with East Jerusalem's Old City and Temple Mount at its core; and many were troubled by the inclusion in the prospective Jewish state of a large Arab minority. But the movement, with Ben-Gurion and Weizmann at the helm, said "yes."

The Palestinian Arabs, along with the rest of the Arab world, said a flat "no"—as they had in 1937, when the Peel Commission had earlier proposed a two-state solution. The Arabs refused to accept the establishment of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine. And, consistently with that "no," the Palestinian Arabs, in November–December 1947, and the Arab states in May 1948, launched hostilities to scupper the resolution's implementation. Many Palestinians may have been unenthusiastic about going to war—but to war they went. They may have been badly led and poorly organized; the war may have been haphazardly unleashed; and many able-bodied males may have avoided service. But Palestinian Arab society went to war, and no Palestinian leader publicly raised his voice in protest or dissent.

The Arab war aim, in both stages of the hostilities, was, at a minimum, to abort the emergence of a Jewish state or to destroy it at inception. The Arab states hoped to accomplish this by conquering all or large parts of the territory allotted to the Jews by the United Nations. And some Arab leaders spoke of driving the Jews into the sea[19] and ridding Palestine "of the Zionist plague."[20] The struggle, as the Arabs saw it, was about the fate of Palestine/ the Land of Israel, all of it, not over this or that part of the country. But, in public, official Arab spokesmen often said that the aim of the May 1948 invasion was to "save" Palestine or "save the Palestinians," definitions more agreeable to Western ears.

The picture of Arab aims was always more complex than Zionist historiography subsequently made out. The chief cause of this complexity was that fly-in-the-ointment, King ʿAbdullah. Jordan's ruler, a pragmatist, was generally skeptical of the Arabs' ability to defeat, let alone destroy, the Yishuv, and fashioned his war aim accordingly: to seize the Arab-populated West Bank, preferably including East Jerusalem. No doubt, had his army been larger and Zionist resistance weaker, he would have headed for Tel Aviv and Haifa;[21] af-

ter all, for years he had tried to persuade the Zionist leaders to agree to Jordanian sovereignty over all of Palestine, with the Jews to receive merely a small, autonomous zone (which he called a "republic") within his expanded kingdom. But, come 1948, he understood the balance of forces: the Jews were simply too powerful and too resolute, and their passion for self-determination was not to be denied.

Other Arab leaders were generally more optimistic. But they, too, had ulterior motives, beyond driving the Jews into the sea or, at the least, aborting the Jewish state. Chief among them was to prevent their fellow leaders (especially ʿAbdullah) from conquering and annexing all or too much of Palestine and to seize as much of Palestine as they could for themselves. This at least partly explains the diffusion of the Egyptian war effort and the drive of its eastern arm through Beersheba and Bethlehem to the outskirts of Jerusalem. It is possible that the commanders of the main, western wing of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, advancing up the coast from Rafah, were instructed to halt, at least for a time, at Isdud, the northernmost point of the southern portion of Palestine allotted by the United Nations for Arab sovereignty. But had the Israelis offered minimal resistance and had the way been clear to push on to Tel Aviv, I have no doubt that the Egyptians would have done so, in line with their public rhetoric. Their systematic destruction of all the Jewish settlements along the way—a phenomenon that was replicated by the Arab armies in the West Bank and Jordan Valley—is indicative of the mindset of the armies and governments involved.

The Yishuv's war aim, initially, was simpler and more modest: to survive; to weather the successive onslaughts, by the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states. The Zionist leaders deeply, genuinely, feared a Middle Eastern reenactment of the Holocaust, which had just ended; the Arabs' public rhetoric reinforced these fears. But as the war progressed, an additional aim began to emerge: to expand the Jewish state beyond the UN-earmarked partition borders. Initially, the desire was to incorporate clusters of Jewish settlements in the state. West Jerusalem, with its hundred thousand Jews, figured most prominently in the Zionist leaders' imagination. But as the war progressed, a more general expansionist aim took hold: to add more territory to the minuscule state and to arm it with defensible borders. By September, some spoke of expanding as far eastward as the Jordan River, seen as a "natural" frontier (both the UN partition borders and the new lines created by the May–July 1948 hostilities were a strategist's nightmare), while incorporating the historic heartland of the Jewish people, Judea and Samaria, in the new state. A third and further aim—which emerged among some of the political leaders, including Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok, and in the military, after

four or five months of hostilities—was to reduce the size of Israel's prospective large and hostile Arab minority, seen as a potential powerful fifth column, by belligerency and expulsion.

Both Arabs and Israelis often argued during 1947–1948 that they were the weaker side, hoping to garner world sympathy and material support. (But occasionally, at the same time and somewhat confusingly, they argued the exact opposite—in order to frighten their enemies or magnetize support and recruits or generate public self-confidence.) During the civil war stage, the Palestinians rather shamefacedly pointed to their poverty and disorganization as opposed to the "power of international Jewry." The Israelis, reluctantly, often acknowledged Palestinian Arab weakness yet, during November 1947–mid-May 1948, argued (1) that the Palestinians enjoyed the support of the vast surrounding Arab hinterland and (2) that the Arab states would soon join in.

An honest appraisal of the balance of strength in the war requires a reassessment of the components of a state's or a society's strength and weakness and necessarily extends the discussion beyond the narrow parameters of military manpower and weapons rosters. The organization and unity of purpose of armies and the effectiveness of their command and control systems is of paramount importance. Measurable categories, such as financial resources, as well as less quantifiable elements, such as levels of motivation and morale, must also be considered. So, too, must details regarding types of weaponry and stockpiles of given types of ammunition and spare parts at different points in time in a protracted struggle as well as the combat experience and training of officers and men. A clear understanding of these and other factors goes a long way to explaining the Yishuv's victory.

In rough demographic and geopolitical terms, without doubt, the Arabs were far, almost infinitely, stronger than the Yishuv. The Palestinian Arabs outnumbered Palestine's Jews by a factor of two to one. And the surrounding Arab states mustered a total population of forty million, with an additional, vast demographic hinterland stretching into the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa to the Atlantic Ocean, as compared with the Yishuv's paltry population of 650,000. The Yishuv, to be sure, received a small stream of volunteers from Diaspora Jewry (and the Christian West). But the Palestinian Arabs and the Arabs of the confrontation states, who both also enjoyed the services of foreign volunteers, were incomparably stronger in demographic terms. And the disproportion in terms of land mass and economic resources, or potential economic resources, was, if anything, even greater.

But the Yishuv had organized for war. The Arabs hadn't. The small, compact Jewish community in Palestine was economically and politically vibrant, a potential powerhouse if adequately organized and directed. And it enjoyed a unity of purpose and a collective fear—of a new Holocaust—that afforded high levels of motivation (as well as magnetizing international support). The fact that the Yishuv was the victim of aggression and that each Jewish soldier was almost literally defending hearth and home added to the motivational edge. This edge was amply demonstrated in places where a handful of poorly armed defenders beat back massive Arab assaults, as at Nirim and Degania in May 1948.

The Palestinian Arabs, with well-established traditions of disunity, corruption, and organizational incompetence, failed to mobilize their resources. They even failed to put together a national militia organization before going to war. Their leaders may have talked, often and noisily, about the "Zionist threat," but they failed to prepare. Perhaps, by the late 1940s, they had come to rely on foreign intervention as the engine of their salvation. Much as, throughout their history, the Palestinian Arabs displayed a knee-jerk penchant to always blame others—the Ottomans, the British, Europe, the United States, the Jews—for whatever ailed them, so, from the mid-1930s on, they exhibited a mindless certainty that, whatever they did or whatever happened, someone—the United Nations, the Great Powers, the Arab states—would pull their chestnuts out of the fire.

The Palestinians (like the surrounding Arab states) had a socioeconomic elite with no tradition of public service or ethos of contribution and sacrifice (typical was the almost complete absence of sons of that elite among the fighters of 1936–1939 and 1948); for many, nationalism was a rhetorical device to amass power or divert resentments rather than a deeply felt emotion. The Palestinian Arabs suffered from a venal leadership and a tradition of imperial domination as well a sense of powerlessness and fatalism. These combined to neuter initiative.

When war came—at their instigation—the Palestinians were unprepared: they lacked a "government" (indeed, almost all the members of the AHC, and many, if not most, NC members were outside the country for most of the civil war), and they were short of arms and ammunition. All told, the eight hundred Arab villages and dozen or so towns of Palestine, in December 1947, may have possessed more light arms than the Yishuv. But they were dispersed and under local control and not standardized, and most of them probably never saw a battlefield. The Palestinians lacked the economic or organizational wherewithal to import arms and ammunition in significant quantities once the hostilities commenced, and the Arab states were niggardly with material support.

The Palestinian militias performed moderately well, when they were on

the offensive, between late November 1947 and the end of March 1948 (though they, and their ALA reinforcements, never conquered a single Jewish settlement). But once the Yishuv went over to the offensive, it was all over. From early April, the Haganah was able to concentrate forces and pick off Arab towns, villages, and clusters of villages in succession and in isolation; villages failed to assist their neighbors, and clusters of villages, neighboring clusters of villages. Almost no villagers came to the aid of townspeople and vice versa. In effect, each community was on its own. And the incompetent and small ALA, though deploying some heavy weapons, failed to make a difference.

Between early April and mid-May, Palestinian Arab society fell apart and was crushed by a relatively poorly armed and, in many ways, ragtag Jewish militia. One day, when the Palestinians face up to their past and produce serious historiography, they will probe these parameters of weakness and responsibility to the full (as well as the functioning of their leadership and society in the months and years before 1948). Among the things they will "discover" will be how few young men from the Hebron, Ramallah, and Nablus areas—largely untouched by the war—actually participated in 1948's battles and how few of them died in the fighting in Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, and the Jezreel and Jordan Valleys. The Yishuv had fought not a "people" but an assortment of regions, towns, and villages. What this says about the Palestinian Arabs, at the time, as a "people" will also need to be confronted.

As to the conventional war, which began with the pan-Arab invasion of 15 May 1948, the Arab states were infinitely larger and more populous than Israel and possessed regular armies, with heavy weapons. Hence, they were "stronger." But Israel nonetheless won, and this requires explanation.[22] After the war, Arab commentators and leaders argued that the Arab states, too, were essentially "weak," given the "newness" of their state structures, their corrupt ruling classes, and the fractious heritage of colonialism. The aim was to score propaganda points in debates in the international arena as well as to "justify" what had happened in the face of criticism by the "street" or opposition parties. The Israelis, for their part, also intent on retaining the image of the underdog, trotted out maps of the Middle East, which highlighted the Yishuv's small size, and tables of comparative heavy weapons strengths, which underlined Israeli weakness. Often, Israeli spokesmen and commentators indulged in statistical acrobatics to prove their point.

But there was a large element of truth in the Israeli claim, certainly in mid-1948, to "weakness." The newborn state was assailed simultaneously from various directions, and Israeli troops in many sectors did end up battling far larger Arab contingents. And in the weeks before 15 May, the Yishuv's lead-

ers could not know or guess how poorly the Arabs would organize for war or how incompetently and disunitedly their armies would perform. The Yishuv was genuinely fearful of the outcome—and the Haganah chiefs' assessment on 12 May of a "fifty-fifty" chance of victory or survival was sincere and typical.

Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan had all achieved independence (or semi-independence) a few years before, and most had new armies with inadequate training and no experience of combat. Their populations consisted largely of illiterate peasants for whom religion, family, clan, and village were the cores of identity and loyalty. They were relatively untouched by the passions of modern nationalism (though were easily swayed by Islamic rhetoric) and lacked technological skills, which bore heavily on the functioning of air and naval forces, artillery, intelligence, and communications. The states themselves were all poor and poorly organized and led by self-serving politicians of varied abilities and ethics; all, except Lebanon, were governed by shambling autocracies, and none, except perhaps Jordan's, enjoyed popular legitimacy or support.

Their armies were all small and poorly equipped. Come 1948, they—except Jordan—failed to mobilize properly, owing to a combination of inefficiency, lack of resources, and overconfidence. And their populations were more easily inclined to rowdy street demonstrations than actually to going off to fight in the harsh hills of Palestine.

In May 1948 all, except Jordan, found it prudent, when dispatching expeditionary forces to Palestine, to leave behind large units to protect the regimes or counter rebellious minorities (such as the Kurds in northern Iraq). Nonetheless, the four armies that invaded on 15 May were far stronger than the Haganah formations they initially encountered, if not in manpower—where they were roughly evenly matched—then in equipment and firepower. The invaders had batteries of modern twenty-five-pounders, tanks, dozens of gun-mounting armored cars, and dozens of combat aircraft. The Haganah had virtually no artillery and initially made do with mortars, no tanks, and no combat aircraft (until the end of May), and its improvised armored car fleet was inferior in every respect.

But the Haganah enjoyed home court advantages—internal lines of communication, higher motivation, familiarity with the terrain—and managed to hold on, even going over to the counterattack, albeit abortively, within days of the invasion. During the following weeks, owing to effective mobilization, the Haganah/IDF gradually overtook the Arab states' armies in terms of manpower. By war's end, the IDF outnumbered the Arab armies engaged in Palestine by a factor of almost two to one. Once the Yishuv had weathered the initial onslaught, the war, in effect, was won. All that re-

mained was to see how much of Palestine it could conquer (or be allowed to hold by the Great Powers) and how severely the invaders would be trounced.

The Great Powers and the United Nations affected the course of the war in a number of significant ways. One was by way of armaments and the asymmetrical effects on the belligerents of the international arms embargos. The Americans imposed an arms embargo on the region starting in December 1947. The United Nations imposed a wider embargo in late May 1948, crucially affecting supplies to the Arab states, which had traditionally received their weapons and ammunition (on credit) from their former colonial masters, Britain and France. The embargo, to which Britain and France were obedient, at a stroke cut off the Arabs from almost all sources of weaponry, ammunition, and spare parts. And they lacked the agility, networks, knowledge, and funds to switch horses in midstream and begin procurement from alternative sources. In effect, the Arab states had to fight the war with what they had in stock, a stock they had failed to build up adequately in the preceding years and that rapidly diminished as the hostilities progressed.

It was otherwise with the Yishuv. The Yishuv had never bought or received arms from states and had developed no prewar dependencies. Instead, it had bought arms in the international black market. It had entered the war with experienced clandestine procurement networks and with the financial backing of American Jewry. In preparation for the war, the Haganah purchased arms or "civilian" equipment convertible to war purposes in the United States (including machine tools needed to produce arms) and in the world's black markets. Once the fighting began, the Yishuv/Israel discovered another, major source of equipment. The Americans and, by and large, the Western European states refused to sell the Haganah arms. But the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, for a combination of reasons—financial, political (anti-British), and ideological-humanitarian (many Czechs saw the Jews as fellow sufferers)—were willing to ignore the United Nations and sell arms to the Yishuv. (The Syrians also made some purchases from the Czech Skoda Arms Works, but they were meager—and they proved unable safely to transport them to Syria. Indeed, Israeli naval commandos twice managed to interdict these shipments in European waters.) From late March 1948 onward, Czech arms—and additional arms from black and gray market sources—poured into Palestine/Israel, enabling the Yishuv to neutralize the Palestinian Arab militias, go over to the offensive, parry the Arab armies' invasion, and, eventually, win the war.

The United Nations' embargo-enforcing machinery, from the start, was inadequate and ineffective. Israel proved adept at circumventing it; the Arabs, except in the matter of dispatching additional manpower to the

fronts, never really tried. In terms of importing militarily professional manpower, the Yishuv also "beat" the Arabs. The Yishuv/Israel managed to attract and hire expert foreign military personnel—(mostly Christian) air- and ground crews, naval personnel, communications experts—and deploy them effectively. It was not primarily a matter of salaries: many came for the adventure, but most because of the Holocaust and sympathy for the beleaguered new state; for some, it was a repeat of the (tragic failed) effort to save the Spanish Republic. Of the Arab states, only the Jordanians, who increased their roster of Britons during the war, managed to recruit and deploy foreign military experts to any real effect. The handful of ex-Nazi Germans or Bosnian Muslims recruited by Syria, Egypt, and the Palestinian Arabs proved of little significance.

The Great Powers and the United Nations significantly affected the course and outcome of the war in other ways. From the start, the Yishuv enjoyed an immense moral advantage stemming from the overwhelming international support, which included the United States and Soviet Union, for partition and Jewish statehood. Without doubt this affected both the Palestinians and the Arab states in their political and military decision-making. Throughout, the Arab leaders were constrained by the thought that they were defying the will of the international community and that, should the Yishuv face defeat and massacre, the Great Powers might well intervene on its behalf. This certainly helped persuade King 'Abdullah on the eve of the invasion that it was pointless to seek the Yishuv's destruction.

But through November 1947–May 1948 the Great Powers failed to intervene in the civil war and force partition down the Arabs' throats and failed again, in May and June 1948, when the Arab states launched a war of aggression, in defiance of the UN resolution, against the Yishuv. The international community refrained from intervention, barring hesitant expressions of verbal displeasure.

But, thereafter, the Western Great Powers (the Russians usually took Israel's side), acting both through the United Nations and often directly and independently, significantly cramped the IDF's style and curtailed its battlefield successes in a series of cease-fire and truce resolutions. Whereas the imposition of the First Truce, which started on 11 June, favored both sides—both needed a respite, though the resulting four weeks of quiet were better used by Israel to regroup and rearm—all the subsequent international interventions clearly and strongly favored the Arabs. Thus it was on 18 July, at the end of the Ten Days, when IDF troops were victorious in the Galilee and the Lydda-Ramla area, and even more tellingly in October and November, when IDF advances had brought the Egyptian forces in the south to the verge of

defeat. The UN–Great Power interventions in December 1948 and early January 1949, after Israel had invaded the Sinai Peninsula, quite simply saved the Egyptian army from annihilation. The IDF had twice been on the verge of closing the trap, first at El ʿArish, and then at Rafah, when the United States and Britain ordered it to pull back—the British bluntly threatening direct military intervention—and Ben-Gurion complied. From July 1948 on, the IDF General Staff planned all its campaigns with an eye to a UN-imposed time-limit or intervention that might snatch victory from the jaws of victory and compelled the Israelis repeatedly to cheat and "steal" extra days of fighting to achieve or partially achieve objectives.

Henceforward, Israel received a well-earned reputation for bamboozling or hampering the functioning of UN observers. But this was largely a consequence of the inequitable and unfair rules of engagement: the Arabs could launch offensives with impunity, but international interventions always hampered and restrained Israel's counterattacks.

As in subsequent wars—in October 1973 and in June 1982—the successive UN cease-fire–standstill resolutions prevented a clear Israeli victory and saved the Arabs from ever greater humiliations. And it was Great Power and UN pressure and intercession that afforded the Egyptians and Syrians face-saving terms in the armistice agreements of 1949. Without these intercessions, it is likely that the talks both with Egypt and with Syria would have broken down and hostilities would have been renewed, ending in further Arab defeats and loss of territory. As it was, the agreements eventually reached assured the Arab states of the retention of some territory inside Palestine (the Gaza Strip) and of demilitarized strips in which neither side was sovereign.

Taken together, these events left Israel with a permanent resentment toward and suspicion of the United Nations, which was only reinforced down the decades by the emergence of the automatic Arab–Muslim–Third World–Communist block–voting majorities against Israel, whatever the merits of each problem brought before the General Assembly and, occasionally, the Security Council.

Like most wars involving built-up areas, the 1948 War resulted in the killing, and occasional massacre, of civilians. During the civil war half of the war, both sides paid little heed to the possible injury or death of civilians as battle raged in the mixed cities and rural landscape of Palestine, though Haganah operational orders frequently specifically cautioned against harming women and children. But the IZL and LHI seem to have indulged in little discrimination, and the Palestinian Arab militias often deliberately targeted civilians. Moreover, the disorganization of the two sides coupled with the

continued presence and nominal rule of the Mandate government obviated the establishment by either side of regular POW camps. This meant that both sides generally refrained from taking prisoners. When the civil war gave way to the conventional war, as the Jewish militias—the Haganah, IZL, and LHI—changed into the IDF and as the Arab militias were replaced by more or less disciplined regular armies, the killing of civilians and prisoners of war almost stopped, except for the series of atrocities committed by IDF troops in Lydda in July and in the Galilee at the end of October and beginning of November 1948.

After the war, the Israelis tended to hail the "purity of arms" of its militiamen and soldiers and to contrast this with Arab barbarism, which on occasion expressed itself in the mutilation of captured Jewish corpses. This reinforced the Israelis' positive self-image and helped them "sell" the new state abroad; it also demonized the enemy. In truth, however, the Jews committed far more atrocities than the Arabs and killed far more civilians and POWs in the course of 1948. This was probably due to the circumstance that the victorious Israelis captured some four hundred Arab villages and towns during April–November 1948, whereas the Palestinian Arabs and ALA failed to take any settlements and the Arab armies that invaded in mid-May overran fewer than a dozen Jewish settlements.

Arab rhetoric may have been more blood curdling and inciteful to atrocity than Jewish public rhetoric—but the war itself afforded the Arabs infinitely fewer opportunities to massacre their foes. Thus, in the course of the civil war the Palestinian Arabs, besides killing the odd prisoner of war, committed only two large massacres—involving forty workers in the Haifa oil refinery and about 150 surrendering or unarmed Haganah men in Kfar ʿEtzion (a massacre in which Jordanian Legionnaires participated—though other Legionnaires at the site prevented atrocities). Some commentators add a third "massacre," the destruction of the convoy of doctors and nurses to Mount Scopus in Jerusalem in mid-April 1948, but this was actually a battle, involving Haganah and Palestine Arab militiamen, though it included, or was followed by, the mass killing of the occupants of a Jewish bus, most of whom were unarmed medical personnel.

The Arab regular armies committed few atrocities and no large-scale massacres of POWs and civilians in the conventional war—even though they conquered the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem and a number of rural settlements, including ʿAtarot and Neve Yaʿakov near Jerusalem, and Nitzanim, Gezer, and Mishmar Hayarden elsewhere.

The Israelis' collective memory of fighters characterized by "purity of arms" is also undermined by the evidence of rapes committed in conquered towns and villages. About a dozen cases—in Jaffa, Acre, and so on—are re-

ported in the available contemporary documentation and, given Arab diffidence about reporting such incidents and the (understandable) silence of the perpetrators, and IDFA censorship of many documents, more, and perhaps many more, cases probably occurred. Arabs appear to have committed few acts of rape. Again, this is explicable in terms of their general failure to conquer Jewish settlements. Altogether, the 1948 War was characterized, in relative terms, by an extremely low incidence of rape (as contrasted with, for example, the Soviet army's conquest of Prussia and eastern Germany in 1945 or the recent Balkan wars).

In the yearlong war, Yishuv troops probably murdered some eight hundred civilians and prisoners of war all told—most of them in several clusters of massacres in captured villages during April–May, July, and October–November 1948. The round of massacres, during Operation Hiram and its immediate aftermath in the Galilee and southern Lebanon, at the end of October and the first week of November 1948 is noteworthy in having occurred so late in the war, when the IDF was generally well disciplined and clearly victorious. This series of killings—at ʿEilabun, Jish, ʿArab al-Mawasi, Saliha, Majd al-Kurum, and so on—was apparently related to a general vengefulness and a desire by local commanders to precipitate a civilian exodus.

In general, from May 1948 onward, both Israel and the Arab states abided by the Geneva convention, took prisoners, and treated them reasonably well. Given that the first half of the war involved hostilities between militias based in a large number of interspersed civilian communities, the conquest of some two hundred villages and urban centers, and the later conquest of two hundred additional villages, 1948 is actually noteworthy for the relatively small number of civilian casualties both in the battles themselves and in the atrocities that accompanied them or followed (compare this, for example, to the casualty rates and atrocities in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s or the Sudanese civil wars of the past fifty years).

In the 1948 war, the Yishuv suffered 5,700–5,800 dead[23]—one quarter of them civilians. This represented almost 1 percent of the Jewish community in Palestine, which stood at 628,000 at the end of November 1947 and 649,000 in May 1948.[24] Of the dead, more than five hundred were female (108 in uniform).[25] The Yishuv suffered about twelve thousand seriously wounded.

Palestinian losses, in civilians and armed irregulars, are unclear: they may have been slightly higher, or much higher, than the Israeli losses. In the 1950s, Haj Amin al-Husseini claimed that "about" twelve thousand Palestinians had died.[26] Egyptian losses, according to an official Egyptian announcement made in June 1950, amounted to some fourteen hundred dead

and 3,731 "permanently invalided."[27] The Jordanian, Iraqi, and Syrian armies each suffered several hundred dead, and the Lebanese suffered several dozen killed.

The war resulted in the creation of some seven hundred thousand Arab refugees.[28] In part, this was a product of the expulsionist elements in the ideologies of both sides in the conflict. By 1948, many in the Zionist leadership accepted the idea and necessity of transfer, and this affected events during the war. But this gradual acceptance was in large part a response to the expulsionist ideology and violent praxis of al-Husseini and his followers during the previous two decades.

Both national movements entered the mid-1940s with an expulsionist element in their ideological baggage. Among the Zionists, it was a minor and secondary element, occasionally entertained and enunciated by key leaders, including Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann. But it had not been part of the original Zionist ideology and was usually trotted out in response to expulsionist or terroristic violence by the Arabs. The fact that the Peel Commission in 1937 supported the transfer of Arabs out of the Jewish state-to-be without doubt consolidated the wide acceptance of the idea among the Zionist leaders.

Although, from Theodor Herzl onward, Zionist leaders and proponents had occasionally suggested transfer, only in the mid-1930s and in the early 1940s did Zionist leaders clearly advocate the idea—in response to the Arab Revolt, which killed hundreds of settlers and threatened to destroy the Yishuv, and Nazi anti-Semitism, which threatened to destroy German, and then European, Jewry. The Zionist leaders believed that a safe and relatively spacious haven was an existential necessity for Europe's hounded Jews, and that this haven could only be found in Palestine—but that to achieve safety and create the necessary space, some or all Palestinian Arabs, given their unremitting belligerence, would have to be transferred. Arab support for a Nazi victory and Haj Amin al-Husseini's employment by the Nazis in World War II Berlin also played a part in this thinking. Zionist expulsionist thinking was thus at least in part a response to expulsionist, or murderous, thinking and behavior by Arabs and European Christians.

Nonetheless, transfer or expulsion was never adopted by the Zionist movement or its main political groupings as official policy at any stage of the movement's evolution—not even in the 1948 War. No doubt this was due in part to Israelis' suspicion that the inclusion of support for transfer in their platforms would alienate Western support for Zionism and cause dissension in Zionist ranks. It was also the result of moral scruples.

During the 1948 War, which was universally viewed, from the Jewish side,

as a war for survival, although there were expulsions and although an atmosphere of what would later be called ethnic cleansing prevailed during critical months, transfer never became a general or declared Zionist policy. Thus, by war's end, even though much of the country had been "cleansed" of Arabs, other parts of the country—notably central Galilee—were left with substantial Muslim Arab populations, and towns in the heart of the Jewish coastal strip, Haifa and Jaffa, were left with an Arab minority. These Arab communities have since prospered and burgeoned and now constitute about 20 percent of Israel's citizenry. At the same time, the Arabs who had fled or been driven out of the areas that became Israel were barred by Israeli government decision and policy from returning to their homes and lands.

By contrast, expulsionist thinking and, where it became possible, behavior, characterized the mainstream of the Palestinian national movement since its inception. "We will push the Zionists into the sea—or they will send us back into the desert," the Jaffa Muslim-Christian Association told the King-Crane Commission as early as 1919.[29]

For the Palestinians, from the start, the clash with the Zionists was a zero-sum game. The Palestinian national movement's leader during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, Haj Amin al-Husseini, consistently rejected territorial compromise and espoused a solution to the Palestine problem that posited all of Palestine as an Arab state and allowed for a Jewish minority composed only of those who had lived in the country before 1914 (or, in a variant, 1917). Thus he marked out all Jews who had arrived in the country after World War I and their progeny for, at the very least, noncitizenship or expulsion—or worse. In Arabic, before Arab audiences, he was often explicit. With Westerners, he was usually evasive, but one cannot doubt his meaning. In January 1937, for example, in his testimony before the Peel Commission, al-Husseini was asked: "Does his eminence think that this country can assimilate and digest the 400,000 Jews now in the country?"

Al-Husseini: "No."

Question: "Some of them would have to be removed by a process kindly or painful as the case may be?"

Al-Husseini: "We must leave all this to the future."

On which the commissioners commented: "We are not questioning the sincerity or the humanity of the Mufti's intentions . . . but we cannot forget what recently happened, despite treaty provisions and explicit assurances, to the Assyrian [Christian] minority in Iraq; nor can we forget that the hatred of the Arab politician for the [Jewish] National Home has never been concealed and that it has now permeated the Arab population as a whole."[30]

Al-Husseini was to remain consistent on this point for the rest of his life. During the war, al-Husseini's rhetoric was considerably upgraded. In March

1948 he told an interviewer in a Jaffa daily *Al Sarih* that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionists were annihilated and the whole of Palestine became a purely Arab state."[31] In 1974, just before his death, he told interviewers: "There is no room for peaceful coexistence with our enemies. The only solution is the liquidation of the foreign conquest in Palestine within its natural frontiers and the establishment of a national Palestinian state on the basis of its Muslim and Christian inhabitants and its Jewish [inhabitants] who lived here before the British conquest in 1917 and their descendants."[32]

Haj Amin was nothing if not consistent. In 1938, Ben-Gurion met Musa Husseini in London. Musa Husseini, a relative and supporter of the mufti (he was executed in 1951 by the Jordanians for his part in the assassination of King 'Abdullah), told Ben-Gurion that Haj Amin "insists on seven per cent [as the maximal percentage of Jews in the total population of Palestine], as it was at the end of the World War." In 1938 the Jews constituted 30 percent of the country's population. How Haj Amin intended to reduce the proportion from 30 to 7 percent Musa Husseini did not explain.[33] (It is not without relevance that this objective was replicated in the constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO], the Palestine National Charter, formulated in 1964 and revised in 1968. Clause 6 states: "The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine before the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians." This "beginning" is defined elsewhere as "1917" or the moment of promulgation of the Balfour Declaration [2 November 1917].)

Such sentiments translated into action in 1948. During the "civil war," when the opportunity arose, Palestinian militiamen who fought alongside the Arab Legion consistently expelled Jewish inhabitants and razed conquered sites, as happened in the 'Etzion Bloc and the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem's Old City. Subsequently, the Arab armies behaved in similar fashion. All the Jewish settlements conquered by the invading Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian armies—about a dozen in all, including Beit Ha'arava, Neve Ya'akov, and 'Atarot in the Jordanian sector; Masada and Sha'ar Hagolan in the Syrian sector; and Yad Mordechai, Nitzanim, and Kfar Darom in the Egyptian sector—were razed after their inhabitants had fled or been incarcerated or expelled.

These expulsions by the Arab regular armies stemmed quite naturally from the expulsionist mindset prevailing in the Arab states. The mindset characterized both the public and the ruling elites. All vilified the Yishuv and opposed the existence of a Jewish state on "their" (sacred Islamic) soil, and all sought its extirpation, albeit with varying degrees of bloody-mindedness. Shouts of "Idbah al Yahud" (slaughter the Jews) characterized equally street demonstrations in Jaffa, Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad both before and

during the war and were, in essence, echoed, usually in tamer language, by most Arab leaders. We do not have verbatim minutes of what these leaders said in closed inter-Arab gatherings. But their statements to Western diplomats, where caution was usually required, were candid enough. "It was possible that in the first phases of the Jewish-Arab conflict the Arabs might meet with initial reverses," King Farouk told the American ambassador to Egypt, S. Pinckney Tuck, just after the passage of the UN General Assembly partition resolution. "[But] in the long run the Arabs would soundly defeat the Jews and drive them out of Palestine."[34] A few weeks earlier, that other potentate, King Ibn Saʿud of Saudi Arabia, had written to President Truman: "The Arabs have definitely decided to oppose [the] establishment of a Jewish state in any part of the Arab world. The dispute between the Arab and Jew will be violent and long-lasting. . . . Even if it is supposed that the Jews will succeed in gaining support for the establishment of a small state by their oppressive and tyrannous means and their money, such a state must perish in a short time. The Arab will isolate such a state from the world and will lay siege to it until it dies by famine. . . . Its end will be the same as that of [the] Crusader states."[35] The establishment of Israel, and the international endorsement that it enjoyed, enraged the Arab world; destruction and expulsion were to be its lot. Without doubt, Arab expulsionism fueled Zionist expulsionist thinking during the 1930s and 1940s.

As it turned out, it was Palestinian Arab society that was smashed, not the Yishuv. The war created the Palestinian refugee problem. Looking back, Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok said, "There are those who say that we uprooted Arabs from their places. But even they will not deny that the source of the problem was the war: had there been no war, the Arabs would not have abandoned their villages, and we would not have expelled them. Had the Arabs from the start accepted the decision of 29 November [1947], a completely different Jewish state would have arisen. . . . In essence the State of Israel would have arisen with a large Arab minority, which would have left its impress on the state, on its manner of governance, and on its economic life, and [this Arab minority] would have constituted an organic part of the state."[36]

Shertok, of course, was right: the refugee problem was created by the war—which the Arabs had launched (though the Arabs would argue, then and subsequently, that the Zionist influx was, since its beginning, an act of aggression and that the Arab launch of the 1947–1948 war was merely an act of self-defense). And it was that war that propelled most of those displaced out of their houses and into refugeedom. Most fled when their villages and towns came under Jewish attack or out of fear of future attack. They wished

to move out of harm's way. At first, during December 1947–March 1948, it was the middle- and upper-class families who fled, abandoning the towns; later, from April on, after the Yishuv shifted to the offensive, it was the urban and rural masses who fled, in a sense emulating their betters. Most of the displaced likely expected to return to their homes within weeks or months, on the coattails of victorious Arab armies or on the back of a UN decision or Great Power intervention. Few expected that their refugeedom would last a lifetime or encompass their children and grandchildren. But it did.

The permanence of the refugee problem owed much to Israel's almost instant decision, taken in the summer of 1948, not to allow back those who had fled or been expelled. The Zionist national and local leaderships almost instantly understood that a refugee return would destabilize the new state, demographically and politically. And the army understood that a refugee return would introduce a militarily subversive fifth column. Again, it was Shertok who explained: "We are resolute not to allow anyone under any circumstances to return. . . . [At best] the return can only be partial and small; the solution [to the problem] lies in the resettlement of the refugees in other countries."[37]

But the Arab states refused to absorb or properly resettle the refugees in their midst. This, too, accounts for the perpetuation of the refugee problem. The Arab states regarded the repatriation of the refugees as an imperative of "justice" and, besides, understood that, in the absence of a return, maintaining the refugees as an embittered, impoverished community would serve their anti-Israeli political and military purposes. As a tool of propaganda, the existence of the refugee communities, many of them in dilapidated "camps," bit into Israel's humane image. And the refugees and their descendants provided a ready pool for recruitment of guerrillas and terrorists who could continuously sting the Jewish state. Besides, many refugees refused permanently to resettle in the host countries because it could be seen as, and could promote, an abandonment of the dream of a return. Hence, the Middle East is dotted with large concentrations of Palestinian refugees—so-called camps that, in reality, are suburban slums, on the peripheries of large Arab towns (Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Nablus, and so on)—living on international handouts this past half-century while continuously stoking the Israeli-Arab conflict, one intifada following hard on the heels of its predecessor.

The Palestinian Arabs, backed by the wider Arab and Muslim worlds, continue to endorse the refugees' right of return and demand its implementation. Many Arabs no doubt view the return as a means of undermining Israel's existence. The Arabs are united in seeing the refugees as a standing reminder of their collective humiliation at the hands of the Yishuv in 1948 and as a token of the "injustice" perpetrated on the Arab world by Israel's

creation (with Western backing). Israel, for its part, has quite logically persisted ever since in resisting the demand for a return, arguing that it would lead instantly, or over time, to its demise. Without doubt, the refugees constitute the most intractable, and explosive, of the problems left by the events of 1948.

The war indirectly created a second, major refugee problem. Partly because of the clash of Jewish and Arab arms in Palestine, some five to six hundred thousand Jews who lived in the Arab world emigrated, were intimidated into flight, or were expelled from their native countries, most of them reaching Israel, with a minority resettling in France, Britain, and the other Western countries. The immediate propellants to flight were the popular Arab hostility, including pogroms, triggered by the war in Palestine and specific governmental measures, amounting to institutionalized discrimination against and oppression of the Jewish minority communities.

Already before the war, Iraq's prime minister had warned British diplomats that if the United Nations decided on a solution to the Palestine problem that was not "satisfactory" to the Arabs, "severe measures should [would?] be taken against all Jews in Arab countries."[38] A few weeks later, the head of the Egyptian delegation to the United Nations, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, announced that "the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish State."[39]

The outbreak of hostilities triggered wide-ranging anti-Jewish measures throughout the Arab world, with the pogroms in Aden—where seventy-six Jews were killed and seventy-eight wounded—and Aleppo—where ten synagogues, five schools, and 150 houses were burnt to the ground—only the most prominent. Anti-Semitic outbreaks were reported as far afield as Peshawar, in Pakistan; Meshed-Izet and Isfahan, in Iran; and Bahrain.[40] An atmosphere of intimidation and terror against Jews was generated by anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic propaganda in the generally state-controlled media. Prime Minister Mahmoud Nuqrashi of Egypt explained to the British ambassador: "All Jews were potential Zionists [and] . . . anyhow all Zionists were Communists."[41] From the start of the clashes in Palestine, the Jewish communities were coerced into making large financial "contributions" to the Arab forces.[42]

In Egypt, the start of the conventional war in mid-May 1948 was accompanied by the promulgation of martial law and the suspension of civil rights, the prevention of Jews from leaving the country, mass detentions (and occasional torture) without charge (the British Jewish Board of Deputies in early June 1948 alleged that "2,500" Jews had been arrested; the Egyptians admitted to about "600")[43] in internment camps,[44] and the confiscation

of Jewish property. Bomb attacks in the Jewish Quarter of Cairo killed dozens.[45] The summer of 1948 was characterized by sporadic street attacks on Jews (and foreigners). The *National-Zeitung* of Basel reported that "at least 50" persons, "most of them Jews," were killed in a series of incidents in Egypt during the week of 18–25 July. The mob attacks and knifings, according to the newspaper, were at least partly orchestrated by the government in order to divert popular attention—and anger—away from Egypt's acceptance of the Second Truce. Cairo, the newspaper reported, "was entirely given over to the terror of the Arab mob . . . which roamed about the streets, howling and screaming 'Yahudi, Yahudi' (Jews). Every European-looking person was attacked. . . . The worst scenes passed off in the Jewish Quarter, where the mob moved from house to house . . . killing hundreds of Jews."[46] On 23 September a bomb exploded in the Jewish Quarter, killing twenty-nine people, "mostly Jews."[47]

In Iraq, following the May 1948 declaration of martial law, hundreds of Jews were arrested (the Iraqi government admitted to "276" Jews detained and "1,188" non-Jews),[48] and Jewish property was arbitrarily confiscated. Jewish students were banned from high schools and universities. Some fifteen hundred Jews were dismissed from government positions, the Iraqi Ministry of Health refused to renew the licenses of Jewish physicians or issue new ones, Jewish merchants' import and export licenses were canceled, and various economic sanctions were imposed on the Jewish community.[49] In January 1949, Prime Minister Nuri Sa'id threatened "that all Iraqi Jews would be expelled if the Israelis did not allow the Arab refugees to return to Palestine."[50] A new "wave of persecution" was unleashed against the 125,000-strong community in early October 1949, with about two thousand being packed off to jails and "concentration camps" and vast amounts of money being extorted in fines on various pretexts.[51] But the Iraqi government kept a tight leash on the "street."

Elsewhere in the Arab world, mobs were given their head. In April 1948, Arabs ransacked Jewish property and attacked Jews in Beirut,[52] and in June, a mob rampaged in British-administered Tripoli, Libya, killing thirteen.[53] That month, in Oujda and Djerada, in French-ruled Morocco, Arab mobs killed dozens of Jews, including some twenty women and children.[54]

Because of this atmosphere of intimidation and violence and oppressive governmental measures—though also because of the "pull" of Zionism (which before 1948 and the establishment of the State of Israel had had little purchase among the Jews of the Islamic world) and Zionist "missionary" efforts—the Jewish communities in the Arab world were propelled into emigration.

The first to leave were Yemen's Jews, the only Oriental Jewish community

with a tradition of (religious) Zionism. (About sixteen thousand Yemeni Jews had emigrated to Palestine in the decades before 1948.) Between May 1949 and August 1950, some forty-three thousand of the forty-five-thousand-strong community packed their bags and trekked to Aden, from where they were airlifted, in Operation Magic Carpet, to Israel. In 1968 there were only two hundred Jews left in Yemen.

Iraq's Jews—a relatively prosperous and well-educated community—began leaving in 1948, even though emigration was illegal. By early 1950, thousands had crossed the border into Iran. In March 1950, the Iraqi government legalized emigration, though the departees had to forfeit their citizenship and property. Between May 1950 and August 1951, the Israeli authorities, assisted by international welfare organizations, airlifted the remaining eighty to ninety thousand Iraqi Jews to Israel. A small number of Iraqi Jews eventually settled in Britain and Brazil.

Four-fifths of Egypt's sixty-five thousand Jews were not Egyptian citizens (they held assorted European passports). About twenty-five thousand left in 1948–1950. The bulk of the remainder left under duress or were deported, with their property confiscated, in 1955–1957, immediately before and after the Sinai-Suez War. By 1970, only about a thousand remained. These, too, subsequently departed.

Most of Syria's fifteen thousand Jews left, illegally, in the wake of the Aleppo pogrom of December 1947 and the declaration of Israeli statehood in May 1948. Palestinian refugees were often installed in their former homes in Damascus and Aleppo. The remainder trickled out during the following decades, as Syria intermittently allowed emigration. All forfeited their property.

The bulk of Libya's forty thousand Jews left the country in 1949–1951, mostly for Israel. Most of Morocco's, Algeria's, and Tunisia's Jews left in the mid-1950s and the 1960s. Apparently, despite the Moroccan pogroms of June 1948, these communities felt relatively safe under French rule. In Morocco, which had the largest of the Maghrebi communities, the sultan, Muhammad V, also afforded the Jews protection. But with the onset of independence, almost all of Morocco's Jews moved to Israel; the elite immigrated to France. A pogrom in Mazagan (El Jadida), near Casablanca, in which eight Jews died and forty houses were torched in August 1955, acted as an important precipitant. Around sixty thousand—of the community's pre-1948 total of about three hundred thousand—left in 1955–1956. A second major wave followed hard on the heels of Muhammad V's death in 1961. Today Morocco's approximately four thousand Jews are the largest Jewish community in the Arab world.

The Arab governments and societies were generally glad to be rid of their

Jewish communities. At base, there was the traditional religious alienation, unease, and animosity. And against the backdrop of the Palestine war, there was vengefulness and genuine fear of the Jews' potential subversiveness; the Jews were identified with Zionism and Israel. As well, the Arab states derived massive economic benefit from the confiscations of property that accompanied the exodus, though the wealthier émigrés, from Baghdad and Egypt, managed to take out some of their assets. But the vast majority, most of them poorly educated or illiterate, lost everything or almost everything. They arrived in Israel penniless or almost penniless. They were immediately granted citizenship and accommodation. But Israel was poor, most of the immigrants knew no Hebrew, and many—especially from the Maghreb— were unsuited to the rigors and demands of life in postwar Israel. There was also a measure of discrimination against the new immigrants. The travails of absorption created a "Sephardi" problem and a cultural divide that wrenched Israeli society in the following decades.

The experience of discrimination and persecution in the Arab world, and the centuries of subjection and humiliation that preceded 1948, had left the emigrant Sephardi communities with a deep dislike, indeed hatred, of that world, which, in the internal Israeli political realm, translated into Arabophobia and hard-line, right-wing voting patterns, both among the first generation of émigrés and among their descendents. This, too, was an indirect by-product of the 1948 War.

Israel's leaders, already in 1948, by way of rebuffing Arab efforts to achieve repatriation of the Palestinian refugees, pointed out that what had taken place was a double exodus, or an unplanned "exchange of population," more or less of equal numbers, with a similar massive loss of property affecting both the Palestinian refugees and the Jewish refugees from Arab lands. These canceled each other out, went the argument, in both humanitarian and economic terms. The Israeli leaders usually added that the Palestinian refugees had brought their demise on themselves by initiating the war on their Jewish neighbors, which resulted in their dispossession and exile, whereas the Jews of the Arab lands had by and large done nothing to offend or aggress and had nonetheless been driven out. And one last difference: the Jewish refugee problem quickly disappeared as Israel absorbed them; the Palestinian refugee problem persisted (and persists), as the Arab states largely failed to absorb their refugees, leaving many of them stateless and languishing in refugee camps and living on international charity.

Economically, the war had done limited harm to Israel, in terms of manpower destroyed, houses and fields trashed, and production impeded. But this was largely offset by the massive influx of Jewish immigrants and the

financial contributions sent by world, especially American, Jewry and by the grants and loans that soon began to arrive from Western governments. A giant demographic and agrarian revolution took place that, within five years, led to the doubling of the Jewish population and of the number of settlements, with all that this implied in terms of agricultural productivity and demographic expansion and dispersion. To some degree, the war had also been beneficial to Israel's fledgling industrial sector.

For the Arab combatants, the war had notched up only economic losses. Their in any case weak economies were further undermined by an increase in foreign debts. And all (save Iraq), to one degree or another, were forced to cope with Palestinian refugees—though by and large this failed to harm them economically as the advent of UNRWA and a steady flow of Western relief capital more than compensated for any losses they may initially have incurred. The major economic harm inflicted by the war on the Arab side was largely to the Palestinians, who lost much of their property, especially land and houses, to the victors.

The war formally ended with the signing of the armistice agreements. Each had included a preamble defining the accord as a step on the road to a comprehensive peace. But none of the agreements had any such immediate issue. During the 1950s and 1960s, with the humiliation of 1948 fresh on its mind, the Arab world was unwilling to make peace with the Jewish state that had arisen in its midst; indeed, the Arab world was not ready for peace. This was demonstrated by the fate of the series of bilateral contacts Israel held during the following years with Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian officials and leaders. Occasionally, the Egyptians hinted at the possibility of nonbelligerency or even "peace" in return for an Israeli cession of all or much of the Negev (something the Egyptians probably knew the Israelis would never agree to); Syria's president, Hosni Za'im, during summer 1949 spoke of peace in exchange for an Israeli cession of half the Sea of Galilee and all of its eastern shoreline, and half the Jordan river (again, something it is unlikely he believed Israel would or could concede). Israel's response to both—as well as to the demands that it accept the repatriation of the refugees (the Arabs usually said they numbered nine hundred thousand to a million persons) and withdraw to the 1947 partition borders—was a resounding "no."

The most serious and protracted negotiations were with Jordan's King 'Abdullah, who appeared sincerely interested in peace (he was largely motivated by the fear that, in the absence of peace, Israel would gobble up the West Bank—which it eventually did, in 1967). But he, too, demanded territory and a substantial measure of refugee repatriation—and, in the end, proved unable to overcome the resistance to peace of his "street" and minis-

ters. When presented with something less than full peace, a five-year nonbelligerency draft agreement, already initialed by his prime minister, he at the last minute balked and declined to sign.

It can be—and has been—argued that with all three countries, but especially with Jordan, Israel could and should have been more forthcoming and that had it assented to the concessions demanded, peace could have been reached and concluded. I have my doubts. Would the 'ulema of Al-Azhar University have agreed? Would the "street" have acquiesced? Would 'Abdullah's fellow leaders have resigned themselves to such a breaking of ranks? Given the atmosphere prevailing in the postwar Arab world, it seems unlikely that any leader could have signed and delivered real, lasting peace, whatever concessions Israel made. The antagonism toward a Jewish state, of any size, was deep and consensual; peace with Israel was seen as treasonous. And the only Arab leader who had seriously conducted peace negotiations was, in fact, murdered (King 'Abdullah in 1951)—as, in fact, was the next Arab leader who dared (President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981).

In addition, a question arises about the reasonableness, justice, and logic of the concessions Israel was being asked to make. After all, the Arab states had attacked Israel, collectively aiming at Israel's destruction or, at the least, truncation. They had failed. But in the process, they had caused grievous losses and destruction to the new state, which was minute by any standards, even with the additional territory won in the war (some two thousand square miles were then added to the six thousand square miles originally allocated for Jewish statehood in the UN partition resolution). And many Arab leaders continued during the following years to speak quite openly of a necessary "second round" and of uprooting the "Zionist entity." Was it reasonable to expect Israel to make major concessions to its would-be destroyers? Would any leader, anywhere, but especially in the semiarid Middle East, have been prepared to give up half of his country's major water resources (the Sea of Galilee and Jordan River) or a large part of its territory (the Negev) in exchange for assurances of peace? Who would have guaranteed the Arabs' continued adherence to their peaceful undertakings after they had swallowed the Israeli concessions?

So much for the bilateral tracks. But, simultaneously, the international community tried, in the wake of 1948, to inaugurate a multilateral negotiation: perhaps what each Arab leader was afraid to do alone he might be induced to pursue together with his peers? United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948 provided for the creation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which began operating, under American chairmanship, early the following year. The members shuttled between the Middle East's capitals in search of the contours of a settlement.

But by April 1949, they had achieved nothing. They decided on a giant gamble: they convoked a full-scale peace conference at Lausanne, Switzerland. The Arabs refused to meet with the Israelis, and made any progress on the major issues—borders, recognition, Jerusalem—contingent on Tel Aviv's agreement to full-scale refugee repatriation. The Arabs also demanded that Israel accept the November 1947 partition borders as the basis for negotiation. Israel refused. A belated Israeli offer, in July, to take back one hundred thousand refugees (actually sixty-five thousand plus those who had already illegally or legally returned to Israeli territory) if the Arab states agreed to settle the rest on their territory, was rejected out of hand. Israel, for its part, turned down an American proposal that it take in about 250,000 refugees. Nothing happened, and in September the delegations went home. The next bout of serious Israeli-Arab peace-making occurred almost thirty years later, after Sadat's astonishing visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.

Negotiating peace with Israel was not the only thing that undermined the legitimacy of Arab leaders. The war itself, and its outcome, had done this as well. The war seriously damaged the ancien régimes of the Arab world. All tottered; some fell within a few years. The Lebanese foreign minister had predicted such consequences a fortnight before the pan-Arab invasion, as the British minister to Beirut reported: "I found His Excellency very depressed. . . . The state of affairs in Egypt and Iraq filled him with gloom. He felt that if the Arabs were defeated in Palestine the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Syria would tumble like a house of cards, with repercussions which would be felt throughout the Arab world."[55]

He was pretty close. A string of assassinations were directly or indirectly linked to the war. Egyptian prime minister Nuqrashi was killed by Muslim Brotherhood gunmen on 28 December 1948 while his troops were still battling the IDF in eastern Sinai. Riad al-Sulh, the Lebanese prime minister, was murdered in Amman more than a year later; and, of course, King ʿAbdullah was assassinated in 1951.

But the war's repercussions went far deeper. In March 1949, shortly before Damascus entered into the armistice negotiations with Israel, the civilian regime was overthrown by a coup d'état engineered by the army's chief of staff, Hosni Zaʿim. Zaʿim himself was overthrown—and murdered—by fellow officers, in August, less than five months after taking power. As it turned out, these events inaugurated two decades of tumultuous military governments, one coup following another, until the accession to power of Hafiz al-Assad in 1970–1971.

And Egypt, too, fell into the hands of the colonels. King Farouk was overthrown by a junta of young officers, led by Colonel Gamal ʿAbdel Nasser, the

veteran of the Faluja Pocket, in July 1952. General Neguib, his fellow veteran, was installed as the first president of the republic. Farouk and his coterie were vilified as the men who had lost, or betrayed, Palestine. The military dictatorship installed that summer for all intents and purposes continues to rule down to the present day (current President Hosni Mubarak, an air force general, inherited the mantle from his mentor, Colonel Anwar Sadat, who was a member of the original revolutionary junta).

The Iraqi monarchy was the last to tumble—though its demise, too, in front of television cameras, in July 1958, was, in part at least, an aftershock of 1948. There, the young colonels, who in effect ruled Baghdad until Saddam Hussein's ouster in 2003, murdered the last of the major Palestine war politicians, Nuri Saʿid.

Perhaps it is not accidental that the only 1948 regime to enjoy longevity, that of the Hashemites of Jordan, was also the only one that emerged from the war relatively victorious. It went on to weather the intake of hundreds of thousands of hostile, destitute Palestinians, King ʿAbdullah's assassination, years of border clashes with Israel, the war of 1967 and the loss of the West Bank, a brief, bloody civil war with the PLO ("Black September") in 1970, and a peace treaty with Israel. Today, the Hashemite regime flourishes, under ʿAbdullah's great-grandson, King ʿAbdullah II.

But 1948 has haunted, and still haunts, the Arab world on the deepest levels of collective identity, ego, and pride. The war was a humiliation from which that world has yet to recover—the antithesis of the glory days of Arab Islamic dominance of the Middle East and the eastern and southern Mediterranean basins. The sense of humiliation only deepened over the succeeding sixty years as Israel visibly grew and prospered while repeatedly beating the Arabs in new wars, as the Palestinian refugee camps burst at the seams while sinking in the mire of international charity and terrorism, and as the Arab world shuttled between culturally self-effacing Westernization and religious fundamentalism.

For almost a millennium, the Arab peoples were reared on tales of power and conquest. Ottoman subjugation ate away at the Arabs' self-image; even more destructive were the gradual encroachment and dominance of (infidel) Western powers, led by Britain and France. The 1948 War was the culminating affront, when a community of some 650,000 Jews—Jews, no less—crushed Palestinian Arab society and then defeated the armies of the surrounding states. The failure was almost complete. The Arab states had failed to "save" the Palestinians and failed to prevent Israel's emergence and acceptance into the comity of nations. And what little Palestine territory the Arabs had managed to retain fell under Israeli sway two decades later.

Viewed from the Israeli perspective, however, 1948 wasn't the irreversible triumph it at first appeared. True, the state had been established, Zionism's traditional chief goal, and its territory had increased; true, the Arab armies had been crushed to such an extent that they would not represent a mortal threat to the Jewish state for two decades.

But the dimensions of the success had given birth to reflexive Arab nonacceptance and powerful revanchist urges. The Jewish state had arisen at the heart of the Muslim Arab world—and that world could not abide it. Peace treaties may eventually have been signed by Egypt and Jordan; but the Arab world—the man in the street, the intellectual in his perch, the soldier in his dugout—refused to recognize or accept what had come to pass. It was a cosmic injustice. And there would be plenty of Arabs, by habit accustomed to think in the long term and egged on by the ever-aggrieved Palestinians, who would never acquiesce in the new Middle Eastern order. Whether 1948 was a passing fancy or has permanently etched the region remains to be seen.

25. "Israel-Jordan General Cease-fire Agreement," 11 March 1949, Israel, ISA, *DFPI*, 3:382–383.

26. Sharett, protocol of Cabinet meeting, 10 March 1949, ISA.

27. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, entry for 11 March 1949, 974.

28. See Morris, *Birth of Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 519–520.

29. Ben-Gurion, protocol of Cabinet meeting of 20 March 1949.

30. Stabler, Amman, to secretary of state, 23 March 1949, USNA, 501.BB Palestine/ 3–2349.

31. Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan*, 386–433.

32. Front "A" to brigades, etc., "Operational Order Shin-Taf-Shin," 16 March 1949, IDFA 922/75//1076.

33. Cohen-Shani, *From Battlefield to Negotiating Table*, 147–161.

34. Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, 10–13.

35. Allon to Ben-Gurion, 27 March 1949, IDFA 1046/70//434.

36. Ben-Gurion, protocol of Cabinet meeting, 27 March 1949, ISA. Ben-Gurion said: "There is not one inch of land from which we are withdrawing. On the contrary, everywhere we are moving into their territory."

37. Text in ISA, *DFPI*, 3:712–722.

38. Selo in "Meeting of the Delegations of Israel and Syria (10 May 1949)," ISA, *DFPI*, 3:557.

39. Rosenne to Eytan, 15 May 1949, ISA, *DFPI*, 3:566–568.

40. Reuven Shiloah to Bunche, 12 May 1949, ISA, *DFPI*, 3:562.

41. Rosenne to Robinson, New York, and Sasson, Paris, 6 April 1949, ISA, *DFPI*, 3:520.

42. Front "A" to OC Seventh Brigade, "Operational Order 'Oren,'" 16 June 1949, IDFA 2289/50//286; Cohen-Shani, *From Battlefield to Negotiating Table*, 163–188.

43. Ben-Gurion, protocol of Cabinet meeting, 18 May 1949, ISA.

44. Rosenne to Ben-Gurion and Sharett, 18 May 1949, ISA, *DFPI*, 3:581–583.

45. Shiloah to Bunche, 12 May 1949, ISA, *DFPI*, 3:563.

46. Paul Mohn to Sharett, 8 June 1949, ISA, *DFPI*, 3:599–600.

47. "Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement (20 July 1949)," ISA, *DFPI*, 3:723–734.

CHAPTER 11. SOME CONCLUSIONS

1. Richard Beaumont to Bernard Burrows, 18 July 1948, PRO FO 371-68375.

2. Protocol of meeting of JAE, 7 July 1938, BGA.

3. Goldmann, *Jewish Paradox*, 99.

4. See Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 8–13.

5. El-Awaisi, *Muslim Brothers*, 8.

6. Thomas Wikeley, Jedda, to FO, 29 August 1943, PRO CO 733/443/18.

7. Ibn Saʿud to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 30 April 1943, PRO CO 733/443/18.

8. "Poster of 'the Shabab Saidna Muhammad' (Cairo)," 2 November 1947, CZA S25-9034.

9. "Off-the-Record Talks in Transjordan of Two British Correspondents," unsigned, Amman, 21 October 1947, CZA S25-9038. The idea that the Jews were responsible for the two world wars was, and remains, pervasive in the Arab world (see, e.g., the fundamentalist Hamas Movement's "Charter," from August 1988).

10. Alec Kirkbride to Ernest Bevin, 13 February 1948, PRO FO 816/116; Kirkbride to Bevin (no. 244), 23 April 1948, PRO FO 816/117.

11. El-Awaisi, *Muslim Brothers*, 9–10.

12. El-Awaisi, *Muslim Brothers*, 14.

13. *Al-Difaʿa*, 8 April 1948, 2.

14. El-Awaisi, *Muslim Brothers*, 15. Al-Banna extolled such martyrdom in the service of jihad as "the art of death" and vilified the Muslims' "love of life" (see Mitchell, *Society*, 207).

15. El-Awaisi, *Muslim Brothers*, 15.

16. Nadia Lourie, "Interview with Mrs. Mogannam [Mughannam]," 10 January 1948, CZA S25-9005.

17. Kirkbride to Bevin (no. 270), 1 May 1948, PRO FO 816/118.

18. Ronald Campbell to FO, 13 December 1948, PRO FO 371-68644.

19. The phrase—"to drive the Jews in Palestine into the sea"—was reportedly used, for example, by ʿIzzedin Shawa, a representative of the AHC in London, in a conversation with an American diplomat (see Gallman, London, to secretary of state, 21 January 1948, USNA, box 5, Jerusalem Consulate General, Classified Records 1948, 800–Palestine). In his memoirs, Kirkbride quoted Arab League secretary-general ʿAzzam saying to him, just before the invasion: "We will sweep them into the sea" (Kirkbride, *From the Wings*, 24).

20. Sam Souki, UP, quoting al-Qawuqji speaking to his troops, undated but from February or March 1948, CZA S25-8996.

21. Jordanian prime minister Abul Huda said as much to Kirkbride (see Kirkbride to Bevin, 15 May 1948, PRO FO 816/120).

22. A shallow, inadequate explanation of the Arab states' defeat, based solely on (often poor) secondary sources, is found in Pollack, *War*, 15–27, 149–155, 269–284, 448–457.

23. Sivan, *1948*, 20.

24. Sivan, *1948*, 21.

25. Sivan, *1948*, 36, 39.

26. Elpeleg, *In the Eyes of the Mufti*, 29.

27. *Jerusalem Post*, 15 June 1950, 3.

28. The word *refugees* is inaccurate as regards two-thirds of this number because they were displaced from their homes in areas that became the State of Israel and came to rest in other parts of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip)—and refugees are usually defined as people displaced from their countries. (About a third came to rest in Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan.) Still less accurate is the definition of the descendants of the bulk of those displaced—their children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren—as refugees, because they themselves were never displaced and, in any case, live in areas of Palestine. Nonetheless, the United Nations

applied the term to all those displaced from their homes in the course of the war—and to their descendants, wherever they now reside. The United Nations now has about four million Palestinian "refugees" on its rolls (the Palestinians claim that the true number is five million).

29. Wasserstein, *Palestine*, 41.

30. *Peel Commission Report*, 141. The reference was to the massacre of more than three hundred Assyrian (Nestorian) Christians by Iraqi troops at Sumayyil in northern Iraq on 11 August 1933. The massacre occurred despite government assurances of protection.

31. Reported in unsigned, untitled Zionist memorandum, 10 March 1948, CZA S25-7733. The memorandum also quoted an interview, in *Al-Ahram*, 9 March 1948, in which al-Qawuqji stated that his objectives in Palestine were "the defeat of partition and the annihilation of the Zionists."

32. Quoted in Shemesh, "Crisis," pt. 2:342.

33. Ben-Gurion, *My Meetings with Arab Leaders*, 197. The two met on 23 February 1938.

34. Tuck to secretary of state, 3 December 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, 5:1295–1296.

35. Ibn Saʿud to Truman, 26 October 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, 5:1212–1213.

36. Moshe Shertok, meeting of Cabinet, 9 February 1949, ISA.

37. Shertok, meeting of Cabinet, 6 February 1949, ISA.

38. Douglas Busk to FO, 12 September 1947, PRO FO 371-61529.

39. JA, "Memorandum on the Situation of the Jews in Iraq," undated but accompanied by a letter from Victor Bernstein to Hector McNeil, 28 October 1949, PRO FO 371-75183.

40. "Memorandum Submitted to the U.N. Economic and Social Council, by the World Jewish Congress," 19 January 1948, PRO FO 371-68366.

41. Campbell to Bevin, 14 June 1948, PRO FO 371-69259.

42. "Memorandum Submitted to the U.N. Economic and Social Council by the World Jewish Congress," 19 January 1948; Elie Eliachar to Herbert Samuel, 31 January 1948, PRO FO 371-68366.

43. Campbell to FO, 26 June 1948, PRO FO 371-69259.

44. A description of a visit to two of these camps by the acting British consul general in Cairo—"the general atmosphere was free and easy"—is appended to Campbell to Bevin, 23 July 1948, PRO FO 371-69259.

45. Unsigned, "Anglo-Jewish Association, Egyptian Crisis," 13 July 1948, PRO FO 371-69259.

46. Translation into English of "Days of Terror," 10, 13 August 1948, *National-Zeitung*, Basel, PRO FO 371-69260. The "hundreds" was probably an exaggeration.

47. Chapman Andrews to FO, 23 September 1948, PRO FO 371-69260.

48. Government of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, untitled memorandum, received by US embassy, Baghdad, 18 November 1949, PRO FO 371-75183.

49. JA, "Memorandum on the Situation of the Jews of Iraq," undated but accompanied by letter from 29 October 1949, PRO FO 371-75183.

50. Henry Mack, Baghdad, to Bevin, 3 March 1949, PRO FO 371-75182.

51. Robert Marcus, World Jewish Congress, to Trygve Lie, United Nations, 8 November 1949, PRO FO 371-75183; World Jewish Congress, "Memorandum on the Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq . . . ," 22 October 1949, PRO FO 371-75183.

52. Houstoun Boswall to FO, 24 April 1948, PRO FO 371-68493.

53. British Military Administration, Tripolitania, "Arab-Jewish Disturbances Tripoli, 12th/13th June, 1948," 21 June 1948, and D. Mowshowitch, Jewish Board of Deputies, London, to R. D. J. Scott-Fox, FO, 17 June 1948, both in PRO FO 371-69422.

54. British consulate general, Rabat, to J. W. Blanch, FO, 15 June 1948, FO 371-73022.

55. Boswall to FO, 2 May 1948, PRO FO 371-68371; unsigned, "Anglo-Jewish Association, the Jews in Moslem Countries, Extracts from a Report Given by a Member of the A.J.A., Who Recently Visited the Countries of the Middle East," 2 September 1948, PRO FO 371-68377.